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THE EFFECTS OF SECTION 1504 OF THE





HIS article focuses on the statutory requirements and delayed im-
plementation of Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Section 1504
of Dodd-Frank, also known as the Cardin-Lugar Amendment, instructs
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate rules re-
quiring resource extraction issuers to include in an annual report infor-
mation relating to any payment made by the issuer, or by a subsidiary or
another entity controlled by the issuer, to a foreign government or the
U.S. Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial develop-
ment of oil, natural gas, or minerals.' The disclosure rule mandated by
Section 1504 is designed to protect those who invest in oil and mining
companies, as well as address the "resource curse" that plagues many de-
veloping economies dependent on resource extraction, by creating in-
creased regulatory transparency.2
More specifically, this article addresses the policy considerations in
favor of and against Section 1504, and how the new regulatory and disclo-
sure regime compares to the practices that existed prior to its enactment.
This article further examines, through the SEC's heavily litigated pro-
posed rules and delayed enactment, Section 1504 to determine whether it
will be effective in meeting its purpose of (1) increased protection and
transparency for investors, and (2) providing information important to
citizens of developing economies dependent on resource extraction seek-
ing to hold their governments accountable for extraction revenue.3 The
*Of Counsel, Freeman Mills PC; J.D. 2015, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.B.A.
McCombs School of Business 2012, University of Texas.
1. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1504, 124 Stat. 1376, 2220-2222 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q) (2010)).
2. See Daniel M. Firger, Note, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse: Exam-
ining the New Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1048-50 (2010).
3. Letter from Benjamin L. Cardin, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Mary Shapiro, Chairwo-
man, SEC (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http:// www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/
specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-94.pdf.
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lack of transparency among companies and financial institutions warrants
discussion because it was one of, if not the, primary causes of the Global
Financial Crisis of 2008.4 With that in mind, Congress is charged with
doing everything in its power to improve transparency in the system and
prevent another similar crisis.5
Part II of this article discusses the background behind Section 1504 and
the regulatory environment before Section 1504 was enacted. Part II de-
votes significant time to the issues and problems that brought about Sec-
tion 1504. It also examines Dodd-Frank's overall goals and
methodologies to provide a foundation for my analysis and give context
to the sweeping reforms ushered in through Dodd-Frank following the
Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
Part III, in turn, analyzes Section 1504 itself. It examines how and why
the section was incorporated into Dodd-Frank, what the law requires, and
what its implications are for consumers, governments, and international
oil companies. Part III also examines conflicting policy perspectives on
different portions of Section 1504 and the SEC's subsequent proposed
rules.
Part IV discusses the legal challenges and major case law stemming
from Section 1504. In particular, it examines (1) American Petroleum
Institute's suit against the SEC that successfully challenged the SEC's
rule requiring public disclosure of payments made to foreign govern-
ments in connection with the commercial development of oil, natural gas,
or minerals; and (2) Oxfam America, Inc.'s recent suit against the SEC
that sought to compel the SEC to issue a revised and finalized resource
extraction disclosure rule-something the SEC has yet to do even though
its mandated deadline under Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank expired more
than three years ago. Part IV also addresses the significance of the SEC's
continued delay in promulgating a finalized rule as a result of the above
litigation, and the delay's implications for both extraction issuers and pro-
ponents of the law.
Part V examines multiple countries' proposed or adopted international
rules modeled after Section 1504. It also discuss how those international
laws and the SEC's impending final revised rule risk creating a patchwork
of international regulation where no clear "world standard" exists, thus
creating additional compliance costs and legal issues for larger extraction
issuers.
Finally, Part VI draws together my conclusions and makes modest rec-
ommendations about how this issue should be resolved. Simply put, to
achieve the expressed Congressional objective of making payments by ex-
tractives companies to governments more transparent, the SEC should
4. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, TIlE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF Fl-E NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ITE CAUSES OF THIE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN TI-IE UNITED STATES, at xix (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], available at http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report.
5. See id.
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produce a strong Section 1504 revised final rule requiring public, project-
level reporting by companies, with no categorical exemptions. This arti-
cle and its accompanying research should contribute to the already-ex-
isting literature, case law, and proposals about Section 1504. In the end,
this article's goal is to determine how well-suited Section 1504 is to ac-
complish its goals and how expeditiously, if ever, final revised disclosure
rules should be put into place by the SEC.
II. BACKGROUND
This section briefly discusses the collapse of U.S. financial markets dur-
ing the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the historical events that paved
the way for Dodd-Frank, Dodd-Frank's general goals and methodology,
and the pre-Section 1504 regulatory environment that existed before
Dodd-Frank.
A. BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 has been described as the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression. 6 While the events leading up
to the crisis started to unfold years before, "it was the collapse of the
housing bubble-fueled by low interest rates, easy and available credit,
scant regulation, and toxic mortgages-that was the spark that ignited a
string of events, which led to a full-blown crisis in the fall of 2008. '" 7 Fur-
thermore, the overall losses were compounded by the "exponential
growth in financial firms' trading activities, unregulated derivatives, and
short-term 'repo' lending markets."'8 Shortly after the financial crisis be-
gan, nearly $11 trillion in household wealth disappeared and many retire-
ment accounts and savings accounts were decimated. 9
In May 2009, Congress created the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion (FCIC) to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current
financial and economic crisis in the United States."' 0 The FCIC's find-
ings, released in January 2011, provide informative conclusions about
what caused the Global Financial Crisis of 2008." l The conclusions most
significant to this article's analysis of Section 1504 were the following: (1)
"A combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of
transparency put the financial system on a collision course with crisis;"
and (2) "There was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. 1 2
Regarding the general lack of transparency in financial markets, the
FCIC found that "[w]ithin the financial system, the dangers of this debt
6. Id. at xv.
7. Id. at xvi.
8. Id. at xvii.
9. Id. at xv.
10. Fraud Enforcement And Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21,
§ 5(a), 123 Stat 1617, 1625 (2009).
11. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION RIEPORT, supra note 4, at xv-xxviii.
12. Id. at xix, xxii.
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were magnified because transparency was not required or desired.' 3
Furthermore, when discussing the breakdown of accountability and eth-
ics, the FCIC noted that "[t]he soundness and the sustained prosperity of
the financial system and our economy rely on the notions of fair dealing,
responsibility, and transparency." 14 These systemic failures-along with
countless others-ultimately led Congress to pass Dodd-Frank.15
B. GENERAL GOALS & METHODOLOGY OF DODD-FRANK
In reaction to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and in an attempt to
avoid (or at least delay) another large-scale financial crisis, Congress
passed Dodd-Frank on July 21, 2010.16 Dodd-Frank's mission, set forth in
its first lines of text, is "to promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial sys-
tem, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices,
and for other purposes.' 7 As discussed later in the article, at least a
portion of Section 1504 is best described as one of the "for other pur-
poses" found in Dodd-Frank's introduction.
Dodd-Frank marked an extensive change to the previous regulatory
structure, a shift that many declared as "the greatest legislative change to
financial supervision since the 1930s."' 8 It created multiple new agencies
and removed others to streamline the regulatory process, increased over-
sight of systemically risky institutions, amended the Federal Reserve Act,
and promoted greater overall transparency.' 9 Davis Polk & Wardwell
LLP estimates that Dodd-Frank will, at a bare minimum, require regula-
tors to create 243 rules, conduct 67 studies, and issue 22 periodic re-
ports.20 But little of that effect was felt immediately because Congress
designed Dodd-Frank to become effective in stages, with a majority of
the rulemaking taking place over the six to months following its
enactment.21
C. PRE-SECTION 1504 REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Prior to Section 1504, few transparency rules aimed at extraction indus-
13. Id. at xx.
14. Id. at xxii.
15. Id. at xxii-iii.
16. 124 Stat. at 1376.
17. Id.
18. Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,




19. Dechert LLP, Executive Summary: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, AM. BANKERS Ass'N, http://www.aba.com/Issues/RegReform/
Pages/RRExecSummary.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
20. Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Enacted into Law on July 21, 2010, supra note 18, at ii.
21. Id. at i.
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tries existed.22 Additionally, most of the initiatives that were in place
were voluntary and lacked depth and specificity, as well as specific penal-
ties or sanctions for a violation.23 Arguably the most popular and wide-
spread pre-Section 1504 program was the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI).24 The EITI is a "coalition of govern-
ments, companies, and civil society working together" to "promote open
and accountable management of natural resources" to "strengthen gov-
ernment and company systems, inform public debate, and enhance
trust. '25 Participants who implement the EITI standard agree to ensure
full disclosure of taxes and other payments made by oil, gas, and mining
companies to governments.26
Before the adoption of Section 1504, thirty-six countries implemented
or were committed to implement the EITI.2 7 But the United States and
many other influential countries had not yet committed to participate.
Critics pointed to three major flaws. 28 First, the EITI was (and still is)
voluntary in nature, which allowed the governments of those countries
that could benefit the most from the initiative to avoid its requirements
by simply declining to join.29 Second, the EITI required countries to re-
port payments only on an aggregate, countrywide basis rather than a dis-
aggregate basis that could account for payments by individual
companies.30 As a result, the aggregated revenue data was often too gen-
eral to be useful when comparing countries.31 Third, there were no pen-
alties or sanctions for violating the initiative's commitments other than
public removal from the EITI.32 This less-than-ideal regulatory environ-
ment paints the backdrop upon which Section 1504 was enacted.
Against the backdrop of this pre-Section 1504 regulatory environment,
the next section of this article discusses the enactment Section 1504's en-
actment, text, and competing policy perspectives.
1II. SECTION 1504
This portion of the article focuses on Section 1504's drafting and enact-
ment, and the legal requirements created by its final text. It also ad-
22. See Branden Carl Berns, note, Will Oil and Gas Issuers Leave U.S. Equity Markets
in Response to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act? Can They Afford Not To?,
2011 CoLUM. Bus. L. RLv. 758, 770-772 (2011).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. What is the EITI?, EXrRACnTVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIvEi, http://eiti.org/
eiti (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
26. Id.
27. Berns, supra note 22, at 770.
28. Id. at 770-71.
29. Id. at 771.
30. Letter from Kyle Isakower, Vice President of Regulatory & Econ. Policy, and Pat-
rick T. Mulva, Chairman of Corporate Fin. Comm., Am. Petroleum Inst., to the
SEC 4 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/spe
cialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-27.pdf.
31. Id.
32. See Firger, supra note 2, at 1067.
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dresses the competing policy perspectives both in favor of and against the
SEC's promulgation of a strong revised final rule. To be clear, Section
1504 of Dodd-Frank is a statutory provision created and adopted by Con-
gress. Through Section 1504, however, Congress mandated the SEC to
promulgate and enforce regulatory rules. The controversy at issue cen-
ters on the initial final rules released by the SEC in 2012, not whether
Section 1504 itself should be repealed. That said, the SEC's initial final
rules tracked Section 1504's language. What's more, they were vacated
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (discussed in
greater detail below). So the main issue now is how Section 1504's lan-
guage should be interpreted and enforced. With that in mind, the de-
tailed analysis of Section 1504 in the following paragraphs is intended to
provide context for the current controversy surrounding the rules
promulgated by the SEC.
A. THE DRAFTING AND SUBSEQUENT ADOPTION OF SECTION 1504
Many commentators question the placement of Section 1504 within
Dodd-Frank. 33 For that reason, it is important to understand the origins
of the text and how it came to be included in Dodd-Frank. Section 1504
is based on the proposed Energy Security Through Transparency Act
(Transparency Act) originally introduced in Congress in September
2009.34 The bill was introduced and sponsored by Senator Lugar (for
himself and Senators Cardin, Schumer, Wicker, Feingold, and
Whitehouse), but was never enacted. 35 While Section 1504 of Dodd-
Frank is more limited in scope, it is conceptually similar to the disclosure
requirements proposed in the Transparency Act.36
The Transparency Act discussed a broad range of policy concerns, in-
cluding (1) promoting good governance in extractive industries to
strengthen national security and foreign policy, and contribute to a better
investment climate for businesses in the United States; (2) providing de-
velopment assistance to countries suffering from the "resource curse,"
(i.e., the tendency of countries that derive a significant portion of reve-
nues from natural resources to have higher poverty rates, weaker govern-
ance, higher rates of conflict, and a poorer development record); (3)
improving the transparency of revenue payments to governments to en-
able citizens "to hold their leaders more accountable"; (4) the "growing
consensus among oil, gas, and mining companies that transparency in rev-
enue payments is good for business [because] it improves the business
climate in which they work and fosters good governance and accountabil-
ity"; and (5) increasing the availability of information to help sharehold-
33. See Paul Hilton, Dodd-Frank Provisions Applicable to Resources Companies Oper-
ating Internationally: Resource Extraction Disclosure Under Section 1504 of the
Dodd-Frank Act, 59 ROCKY Mam. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-4 to -5 (2013).
34. Id.; Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009, S. 1700, 111th Cong. § 1
(2009).
35. S. 1700.
36. Id.; Hilton, supra note 33, at 18-4.
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ers of public companies "assess financial risk, compare payments from
country to country, and assess whether such payments help to create a
more stable investment climate. '3 7 These same policy considerations un-
derpin Section 1504 and were considered by the SEC in its rulemaking
process in implementing Section 1504.38
According to the Congressional Record, Senators Lugar and Cardin
inserted Section 1504, also known as the Cardin-Lugar Amendment, into
Dodd-Frank during the late stages of conference negotiations. 39 Senator
Dodd remarked on its late insertion, noting that
[b]ecause we have not yet been able to hold hearings on this measure
this year-something which I had hoped to do in the Banking Com-
mittee once we had completed this historic financial reform mea-
sure-I am not sure we have all the precise details and the language
exactly right, but the thrust is exactly right and, therefore, in my
view, the amendment by Senators Cardin and Lugar ought to be
adopted. 40
Senator Dodd additionally explained that "[w]e can work on the details,
if we have to, later on, but we should not miss this opportunity provided
by this legislation to make this historic contribution to something that not
only benefits investors here at home but might make a huge difference in
the wealth and opportunity in these countries."' 41 On the recommenda-
tion of Senator Dodd and others, Section 1504 was quickly adopted with
little debate.42 The above quotes demonstrate the relative ease in which
the Lugar-Cardin Amendment was examined, considered, and adopted. 43
B. CONDUCT & ACrIONS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1504
Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. 44
Dodd-Frank amended "Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78m). ' ' 45 Section 1504, titled "Disclosure of Payments by Re-
source Extraction Issuers," requires the SEC to:
[n]ot later than 270 days after July 21, 2010 ... issue final rules that
require each resource extraction issuer to include in an annual report
of the resource extraction issuer information relating to any payment
made by the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the resource
extraction issuer, or an entity under the control of the resource ex-
37. S. 1700.
38. See 156 Cong. Rec. S3794, 3815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Rich-
ard Lugar).
39. 156 Cong. Rec. S3794, 3815 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ben
Cardin).
40. 156 Cong. Rec. S3794, 3818 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Chris
Dodd).
41. Id.
42. 156 Cong. Rec. S3794, 3819 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Presiding Of-
ficer Sen. Mark Warner and Sen. Chris Dodd).
43. Id.
44. 124 Stat. at 1376.
45. Id. at 2220.
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traction issuer to a foreign government or the Federal Government
for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals, including-(i) the type and total amount of such payments
made for each project of the resource extraction issuer relating to the
commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals; and (ii) the
type and total amount of such payments made to each government.46
The "Definitions" subsection of 15 U.S.C. 78m(q) is specific in its
description of key terms. 47 For instance, a "'resource extraction issuer'
is an issuer that: "(1) is required to file an annual report with the [SEC];
and (2) engages in the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals. '48 In addition, "'commercial development of oil, natural gas,
or minerals' includes exploration, extraction, processing, export, and
other significant actions relating to oil, natural gas, or minerals, or the
acquisition of a license for any such activity, as determined by the
[SEC]. ' ' 4 9 And "'foreign government' means a foreign government, a de-
partment, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government, or a com-
pany owned by a foreign government, as determined by the [SEC]." '50
But perhaps most specific of all is "'payment,'" which means "a payment
that is (1) made to further the commercial development of oil, natural
gas, or minerals, and; (2) not de minimis." 51 "'Payment"' expressly in-
cludes "taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), production entitle-
ments, bonuses, and other material benefits, that the [SEC], consistent
with the guidelines of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(to the extent practicable), determines are part of the commonly recog-
nized revenue stream for the commercial development of oil, natural gas,
or minerals."15 2
The section further dictates that
[t]he interactive data standard shall include electronic tags that iden-
tify, for any payments made by a resource extraction issuer to a for-
eign government or the Federal Government - (i) the total amounts
of the payments, by category, (ii) the currency used to make the pay-
ments, (iii) the financial period in which the payments were made,
(iv) the business segment of the resource extraction issuer that made
the payments, (v) the government that received the payments and
the country in which the government is located, (vi) the project of
the resource extraction issuer to which the payments relate, and (vii)
such other information as the [SEC] may determine is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 53
Additionally, the Act requires that "[t]o the extent practicable, the [SEC]
shall make available online, to the public, a compilation of the informa-
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q)(2)(A) (2010).
47. See id. § 78m(q)(1).
48. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(D).
49. Id. § 78m(q)(l)(A).
50. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(B).
51. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C)(i).
52. Id. § 78m(q)(1)(C)(ii).
53. Id. § 78m(q)(2)(D)(ii).
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tion required to be submitted under the rules issued under [Section
78m(q)(2)(A)]. ' 54
Moreover, in affirmation of one of its overall objectives, Section
78m(q)(2)(E), titled "International transparency efforts" states that, "[t]o
the extent practicable, the rules issued under [Section 78m(q)(2)(A)]
shall support the commitment of the Federal Government to interna-
tional transparency promotion efforts relating to the commercial develop-
ment of oil, natural gas, or minerals. ' 55 Finally, Section 78m(q)(2)(F)
provides that the final rules "shall take effect on the date on which the
resource extraction issuer is required to submit an annual report relating
to the fiscal year... that ends not earlier than [one] year after the date on
which the [SEC] issues final rules under [Section 78m(q)(2)(A)]. ' '56
On September 12, 2012, the SEC promulgated final rules that generally
tracked the language of Section 1504.57
Consistent with the [congressional record] and in light of the struc-
ture, language, and purpose of the statute, the final rules do not pro-
vide any exemptions from the disclosure requirements. As such, the
final rules do not include an exemption for certain categories of issu-
ers or for resource extraction issuers subject to similar reporting re-
quirements under home country laws, listing rules, or an EITI
program. The final rules also do not provide an exemption for situa-
tions in which foreign law may prohibit the required disclosure. In
addition, the final rules do not provide an exemption for instances in
which an issuer has a confidentiality provision in an existing or future
contract or for commercially sensitive information.58
Given the nature of Section 1504 and the SEC's initial final rules, the
next section of this article discusses the policy perspectives both in favor
of and against Section 1504.
C. POLICY PERSPECrIVES IN FAVOR OF SECrION 1504
The majority of policy perspectives that seem in favor of a strong SEC
final rule based on Section 1504 focus on the benefits of greater trans-
parency for investors and improved accountability for impoverished citi-
zens in resource rich countries.59 Commentators also tout the ancillary
benefit that a strong Section 1504 would have on the Extractive Industry
54. Id. § 78m(q)(3)(A).
55. Id. § 78m(q)(2)(E).
56. Id. § 78m(q)(2)(F).
57. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365
(Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
58. Id. at 56,368.
59. See EITI, IMPLEMENTING EITI FoR IMPACr: HANDBOOK FOR POLICY MAKERS
AND STAKEHOLDERS 3-4, 144-45 (Anwar Ravat & Sridar P. Kannan eds., 2012)
available at https:/feiti.org/files/lmplementing%20EITI%20for%201mpactHand
book %20for% 20Policy%20Makers% 20and %20Stakeholders.pdf.
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Transparency Initiative and other similar programs.60
1. Greater Transparency Benefits Investors
A large number of institutional investors-and the investing commu-
nity as a whole-have voiced support for a strong Section 1504-based fi-
nal rule that establishes disclosure requirements consistent with other
jurisdictions, such as the European Union (EU).61 For the better part of
a decade, investors representing more than $6 trillion in assets under
management have sent letters to the SEC recommending it reissue a
strong Section 1504 final rule. 62 The group of leading investors also en-
couraged the SEC to "continue its vigorous defense of the Section 1504
rules as it responds to the U.S. District Court's decision [in American
Petroleum Institute et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission]. '63
Within their comment, these large institutional investors argued that
[p]ayment disclosure regulations, such as Section 1504 and the Euro-
pean Union Transparency Directive, play a critical role in encourag-
ing greater stability in resource-rich countries, which benefits both
the citizens of those countries and investors."64 Furthermore, the in-
vestors noted that "[i]t is in the interest of investors and companies
subject to both the U.S. and EU requirements that the reporting ob-
ligations in these jurisdictions are as uniform as possible. Consistent
and predictable regulations may lower compliance costs and enhance
the salience of disclosures. 65
In addition to possibly lowering compliance costs, uniform disclosure
requirements under Section 1504 will provide investors all over the world
with the information they need to better assess the potential risks and
rewards of an investment.66 Most international exploration and develop-
ment projects for oil and natural gas are multi-billion dollar operations
and lease bonuses and royalty payments often costs millions of dollars. 67
With that in mind, everyday investors want to know where their money is
going and how it is being used.68 Pre-Section 1504, most of this informa-
tion was subject to confidentiality agreements negotiated by the parties.69
60. See Letter from Patrick Mulva, Vice President & Controler, ExxonMobil Corp., to
Comm'rs, SEC. 2 (Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-42-
10/s74210-112.pdf.
61. See Daniel Kaufmann, Transparency in Natural Resources: Why is the U.S. Playing
Cath Up?, BROOKINGS (June 9, 2014, 12:14 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
up-front/posts/2014/06/09-transparency-natural-resources-kaufmann.
62. See Letter from Columbia Ctr. on Sust. Inv. to Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC
2 (Oct. 30, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-ex
traction-issuers/resourceextractionissuers-93.pdf.
63. See Letter from Investors to Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC, at para. 2 (Oct.
30, 2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-extraction
-issuers/resourceextractionissuers-93.pdf.
64. Id. para. 4.
65. Id. para. 3.
66. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,399.
67. Id. at 56,400.
68. Id. at 56,398.
69. Id. at 56,399.
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With a strong Section 1504-based disclosure rule in place, investors will
have more power to hold the companies they invest in accountable, which
in turn will force them to manage their financial resources more
diligently.70
2. Increased Accountability for Impoverished Citizens in Resource-Rich
Countries
Similar to the benefits investors receive from increased transparency
and disclosure in extraction-related industries, impoverished citizens in
resource-rich countries tremendously benefit from strong Section 1504-
based regulations by having access to information that allows them to
better keep their countries' leaders accountable for large payments from
extraction-related activities.7 1 On April 14, 2014, a group of 544 civil so-
ciety organization, from 40 countries around the world, united by Publish
What You Pay Coalition's International Director, Marinke Van Riet,
wrote a letter to the SEC to "urge [the SEC] to re-issue an implementing
rule for the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Section 1504) that aligns with the EU Accounting and Transparency
Directives, with no country exemptions and full public disclosure of pay-
ments, without delay."' 72 The groups represented included "human
rights, faith-based, anti-corruption and environmental" organizations
from countries "rich in natural resources, but blighted by corruption, con-
flict and poverty. '7 3 In their comment, these civil society organizations
argued that "[g]reater transparency of extractive industry revenues will
reduce natural resource related corruption and conflict, and help ensure
these resources are transformed into lasting public benefits. '74
The comment further argues that including project-level reporting will
bring the greatest benefit to citizens in resource-dependent countries-
noting that transparency requirements are even more important in areas
where local revenue-sharing agreements are in place.75 For example, in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, there are national laws that require
twenty-five percent of tax revenues from mining projects to go back to
the province, and fifteen percent to go back to the local territory where
the development took place.76 "Similarly in the Philippines, indigenous
communities have a legal right to a minimum of [one percent] of royalties
from mining in their ancestral domains. ' 77 But in each of these countries
and regions, the local citizens likely never collect the full amount they are
70. ExT ACIIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, supra note 59, at 69.
71. See Letter from Marinke Van Riet, Int'l Dir., Publish What You Pay Coal., to
Mary Jo White, Comm'n, SEC, at para. 2 (Apr. 14, 2014), available at http://www
.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-extraction-issuers/resourceextractionissu-
ers-32.pdf.
72. Id. para. 1.
73. Id. para. 2.
74. Id.; see also Letter from Patrick Mulva to Comm'rs, supra note 60, at 2.
75. See Letter from Marinke Van Riet to Mary Jo White, supra note 71, para. 2.
76. Id. para. 8.
77. Id. para. 9.
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owed because there is no way for them to know how much taxes or royal-
ties are being generated given the lack of transparency.
78
An additional example of the "resource curse" negatively affecting, or
at least failing to benefit, impoverished citizens in resource-rich countries
can be found in Nigeria. 79 The citizens of Nigeria, sub-Saharan Africa's
largest oil producer, are painfully aware of the consequences of the lack
of transparency in the extractives industry.80 According to Faith Nwad-
ishi, Nigerian National Coordinator for Publish What You Pay, "[i]n re-
source-rich countries with weak institutions, like Nigeria, corruption is
already a significant risk," and "[w]hen oil, gas and mining projects gener-
ate billions of dollars in revenue in secrecy, they end up fueling corrup-
tion." 81 As an example of this corruption, Ms. Nwadishi states that,
"Nigeria was missing $20 billion of oil revenues [last year] while its citi-
zens suffered from poverty. '82 And for reasons like these, Publish What
You Pay argues that project-level transparency is necessary in Section
1504.83 Next, I will discuss the beneficial impact a strong Section 1504
final rule could have on the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative.
3. Beneficial Impact on the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
In addition to the benefits of greater transparency for investors and
increased accountability for impoverished citizens in recourse-rich coun-
tries, an ancillary benefit of a strong Section 1504 rule would be the bene-
ficial impact it would have on the EITI. When Section 1504 was adopted,
it was not intended to replace the EITI.84 Instead, it was intended to
complement the EITI and magnify its positive effects. 85 More countries
will be encouraged to join the EITI because disclosed payment informa-
tion will be made available for countries not yet signed up to the EITI.86
The availability of this payment information may allow transparency
advocates to demonstrate that part of the process is already underway
and that the government must match those efforts with the remaining
components of national EITI implementation. 87 Many commentators
also argue that, in these cases, Section 1504 will "create a precedent and
78. Id.
79. See Jana Morgan, SEC announces plan to implement landmark oil, gas and mining
transparency law Sen., investors and transparency advocates urge the SEC to take








85. 156 CONG. REC. S3817 (daily ed. May 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cardin).
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provide the necessary first step toward transparency. ' 88 A strong Section
1504-based SEC final rule would "create a flow of high-quality financial
data for inclusion in EITI reports" and would ensure that payment infor-
mation data is available from each extractive company that operates in a
region. 89 According to transparency advocates, one of the biggest weak-
nesses of the EITI thus far has been the difficulty of obtaining payment
information from large companies operating in EITI implementing coun-
tries. 90 A strong Section 1504 final rule would make it harder, if not im-
possible, for companies to dodge the disclosure requirements. 91 In the
next portion of this article, I will discuss the policy perspectives against a
strong Section 1504-based SEC final rule.
D. POLICY PERSPECTIVES AGAINST SECTION 1504
Policy perspectives against a strong SEC final rule based on Section
1504 center on the massive amount of additional compliance issues that
are created with the new Section 1504 requirements and the possible
competitive advantage countries and companies that are not required to
report to the SEC could gain by not being required to disclose this cur-
rently classified information.92 Additionally, many commentators are
concerned that the law wrongly infringes on foreign countries' laws and
contracts that contain confidentiality provisions and prohibit the disclo-
sure of the type of information Section 1504 mandates.93
1. Compliance Costs
One of the biggest issues commentators have with a strong, no categor-
ical exceptions, project-by-project structured Section 1504 rule is that it
will likely create a substantial amount of initial and ongoing compliance
costs. 94 While the pundits debate the time, personnel, and monetary bur-
dens created by the requirements of the rule, the SEC itself, based on its
estimates, believed that the original rule would cost U.S. issuers about
one billion dollars in initial compliance cost, with ongoing compliance
costs between $200 million and $400 million annually. 95 If correct,
"[t]hese estimates would make Section 1504 one of the most costly rules
in history and it only applies to one industrial sector."' 96 Therefore, the




91. See 156 CONG. REC. S3817, supra note 85.
92. Am. Petroleum Inst. V. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d. 5, 21 (D.D.C. 2013).
93. Id. at 12.
94. Id. at 21.
95. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365,
56,398 (Sept. 12, 2012)(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
96. Brigham A. McCown, Oil and Gas Payment Disclosure May Harm Investors,
Foitn-Ls ENFRGY, para. 9 (March 22, 2013, 10:27 AM), available at http:// www
.forbes.comlsites/brighammccown/2013/03/22/oil-and-gas-payment-disclosure-may-
harm-investors/.
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parency benefits of Section 1504 outweigh the costs imposed by the
rule? 9
7
Furthermore, the burdens of increased disclosure are likely to be the
highest on larger, more diversified companies because they conduct oper-
ations in many countries simultaneously and have multiple projects in op-
eration within any given year.98 For example, ExxonMobil's Vice
President and Controller, Patrick T. Mulva, submitted a comment letter
to the SEC estimating that the cost to ExxonMobil of implementing Sec-
tion 1504 would exceed $50 million and that "[tihe cost and extent of this
should not be underestimated, as some observers who are not familiar
with the reality of financial reporting systems appear to have done." 99
Additionally, Royal Dutch Shell's (Shell) comment letter to the SEC
stated that, given Shell's expansive operations in over ninety countries, it
believed that "integrating such detailed project reporting requirements
into our current financial reporting and control systems could cost hun-
dreds of millions of dollars."'100 Thus, the cost of compliance is likely to
be substantial for almost every extraction issuer affected by the rule.' 0 '
The next portion of this article will discuss the possible competitive ad-
vantage companies who are not required to satisfy Section 1504 require-
ments might achieve when competitors are forced to disclose proprietary
payment information and they are not.
2. Possible Competitive Advantage for Non-Section 1504 Companies
An additional policy perspective against Section 1504 is that the public
disclosures required by companies subject to Section 1504 may create a
substantial disadvantage because competitors will have access to proprie-
tary information such as costs, investments, and lease payments without
having to disclose this information themselves.' 0 2 According to the SEC,
over 1,100 companies will be covered by the information disclosure re-
quirements under Section 1504, including a majority of the most profita-
ble international oil companies (e.g., Chevron, Exxon, BP, Shell and
Total), the largest global mining companies (e.g., Rio Tinto, Vale and
BHP Billiton) and certain state-owned entities (e.g., Petrobras, Sinopec
and Petrochina).10 3
But most of the state-owned oil companies and some of the largest oil
companies in the world, in countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and
Venezuela do not operate under SEC regulation, thus, they are not sub-
97. Id. para 13-14.
98. See Letter from Patrick Mulva to Comm'rs, supra note 60, para. 2.
99. Id. para. 3.
100. Letter from Martin Brink, Royal Dutch Shell to Meredith Cross, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Dir. para. 24 (Oct. 25, 2010) (on file with author), available at http://www
.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/speciaizeddisclosures-33.pdf.
101. Id. para. 24.
102. Q&A: Company Disclosures Under Dodd-Frank Sec. 1504, NATURAL RESOURCE
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE para. 24 (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.resourcegovernance
.org/news/qa-company-disclosures-under-dodd-frank-section-1 504.
103. Id. para. 24.
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ject to the Section 1504 disclosure requirements.' 0 4
Therefore, many people in the oil and gas industry, including the
American Petroleum Institute (a lobbying group comprised of many ma-
jor U.S. oil and gas companies) are concerned that non-U.S. companies,
such as Russia's Gazprom, who are not required to disclose information
under the proposed rules of Section 1504, could use the data to outma-
neuver U.S. companies in contract negotiations.' 0 5 According to those
pundits, "[t]he rule would have put U.S.-listed firms at an insurmountable
disadvantage to state-owned firms, which are information black holes and
most likely to do backroom deals with tyrants."'1 6 While the potential
competitive disadvantages of Section 1504 are likely not insurmountable,
they do provide important perspectives that need to be carefully consid-
ered as the SEC promulgates a revised final Section 1504 rule.
2. Host Country Legal and Contractual Issues
In addition to the potentially large compliance costs and the possible
competitive advantages for non-Section 1504 companies, Section 1504
creates host-country legal and contractual issues that will likely require
renegotiating and redrafting a large number of contracts. 10 7 Addition-
ally, many industry executives note that confidentiality agreements may
prevent oil and gas companies from disclosing information to third par-
ties concerning their arrangements to purchase oil or gas from host coun-
tries.1 08 Thus, disclosures to the SEC under Section 1504 could create a
potential breach of contract if these matters are not addressed in
advance. 0 9
Additionally, multiple countries, such as Angola, Cameroon, China,
and Qatar, have laws that forbid disclosures. 110 And to this point, the
SEC has resisted requests to include an exemption for companies that are
contractually prevented from disclosing payments made to host govern-
ments. 111 Therefore, many companies, including Shell, are concerned
that their existing contracts currently prohibit disclosure of Section 1504
payment information and renegotiation to amend all of the currently
valid contracts would be costly.11 2 This area likely requires additional
examination by Congress and the SEC to determine what the appropriate
revised final rule should include.t 13 The next portion of this article will
104. Id. para. 16-17.
105. The SEC's Pro-Putin Rule, Tim WALl ST. J. para. 2-3 (May 11, 2014, 7:03 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304518704579523982321856704.
106. Id. para. 4.
107. See Letter from Martin Brink to Meredith Cross, supra note 100, para. 14.
108. See id. para. 8.
109. See id.
110. Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,365,
56,370 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249).
111. Id. at 56,472.
112. See Letter from Martin Brink to Meredith Cross, supra note 100, para. 14.
113. See id. supra note 100, para. 20.
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discuss the legal challenges and major case law that has arisen as a result
of Section 1504.
IV. IMPORTANT CASE LAW & ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY
This portion of the article will focus on the significant legal cases that
have transpired as a result of the inclusion of Section 1504 in the Dodd-
Frank Act. 14 Given that the Act was created and adopted by Congress
but requires the rulemaking to be done separately by the SEC, lawsuits
have been filed successfully challenging the validity of the SEC's final
rule, as well as a relatively new lawsuit that seeks to end the SEC's long
delay in promulgating a revised final rule. 115 Additionally, this section of
the article will discuss the implications regarding the SEC's major delay
in issuing revised final rules and examine similar international rules that
have been adopted since Section 1504 was signed into law. 116
A. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE V. SEC
In American Petroleum Institute v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, industry associations brought an action to challenge the SEC's rule
requiring public disclosure of payments made to foreign governments in
connection with the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or min-
erals. 1 7 The Court of Appeals had dismissed the associations' simultane-
ously filed petition challenging the rule for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 18 After both parties cross-moved for summary judgment,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the plaintiff's
motion and denied the defendant's motion. 1 9 In an opinion dated July 2,
2013, the court held the following: (1) The SEC's interpretation of Dodd-
Frank Act in promulgating rule was not entitled to deference; (2) The
SEC misread Dodd-Frank Act to mandate public disclosure of the re-
ports, and thus, the agency's action was invalid; (3) The SEC's denial of
an exemption for countries prohibiting payment disclosure was arbitrary
and capricious; and (4) Vacatur of the rule was an appropriate remedy.' 20
The court provided multiple explanations and rationales to justify its
holding. The court noted that the SEC's interpretation of Section 1504
"was not entitled to deference, where [the] SEC did not exercise its own
judgment, but instead considered itself bound by statute to require public
filing of the reports.' 12 1 Additionally, the court provided that because
the SEC's rule was based "on its misreading of the statute to mandate
public disclosure... [the] agency's action was invalid.' 22 The court con-
114. See Am. Petroleum Inst., 953 F. Supp. 2d at 5.
115. See id.
116. See Letter from Martin Brink to Meredith Cross, supra note 100, para. 25.
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122. Id. at 13-14.
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cluded that "the statute said nothing about the 'public' filing of reports,
the statute's public availability requirement was limited to a compilation
of information, and the Exchange Act as a whole used the word 'report'
to refer to disclosures made to SEC alone. ' 123 Furthermore, the court
noted that, "if disclosing some of the information publicly would compro-
mise commercially sensitive information and impose high costs on share-
holders and investors, then the [SEC] may selectively omit that
information from the public compilation." 124 These conclusions centered
on the wording of the statute including "to the extent practicable," 12 5
meaning it should only be done if realistic under the circumstances.
Finally, after finding the SEC's rule invalid for the reasons listed above,
the court concluded that vacatur of the rule "was the appropriate rem-
edy" because the "issuers had not yet been required to make disclosures
under the rule, so no disruption would result from vacatur, the rule's defi-
ciencies were grave enough to warrant vacatur, and the SEC offered vir-
tually no argument against vacatur. ' '126 In conclusion, while the
American Petroleum Institutes' lawsuit was only successful in getting the
SEC's rule vacated based on a few minor technicalities, the ruling has
been instrumental in delaying the implementation of another version of a
Section 1504-based rule to this date.
B. OXFAM AMERICA, INC. V. SEC
In response to the ruling in the American Petroleum Institute case ana-
lyzed above, and the SEC's lack of promulgating a revised final rule,
Oxfam America, Inc. (Oxfam) brought a lawsuit against the SEC on Sep-
tember 18, 2014, seeking to compel them to issue a revised final rule im-
plementing Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 12 7 This civil action was
brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1),
which provides a remedy to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed."'1 28
According to its complaint, Oxfam "is a nonprofit international devel-
opment and relief organization dedicated to finding lasting solutions to
poverty and related injustice. ' 129 Additionally, "[a] core mission of
Oxfam America is to advance resource revenue accountability around the
world, engaging with resource extraction issuers, governments and inter-
national organizations, as well as with local communities and civil society
organizations to promote responsible and accountable stewardship of
123. Id.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Id. at 22.
126. Id. at 24-25.
127. Oxfam Am., Inc. v. SEC, No. 14-13648-DJC, 2015 WL 5156554 (D. Mass. Sept. 2,
2015).
128. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
129. Oxfam America Complaint at 13, Oxfam Am., Inc. v. SEC, No. 1:14-CV-13648 (D.
Mass. Sept. 2, 2015).
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revenues from extractive resources. ' 130 In its lawsuit, Oxfam alleges that,
"[b]y vacating and remanding the 2012 final rule to the SEC, the District
Court [in American Petroleum Institute] restored the status quo before
the 2012 final rule took effect." 13'
Oxfam challenges the SEC's lack of final rule promulgation based on
its organization's interest in combating the resource curse facing many
citizens of countries with minerals, as well as its interest as an owner of
the securities of several resource extraction issuers that would be subject
to a revised final rule implementing Section 1504.132 Additionally,
Oxfam notes that "[a]ccess to the disclosures mandated by Section 1504
would allow Oxfam America to better assess investment risks associated
with extractive industry payments to governments. u33
In its complaint, Oxfam claims it "is directly injured by the SEC's fail-
ure to issue a final rule by the statutory deadline" and that "[tihe infor-
mation that would be disclosed pursuant to Section 1504 would be of
direct value to Oxfam America, both as a shareholder and as an organiza-
tion with a mission to advance accountability in the management of ex-
tractive resource revenues around the world."'1 34 In addition, Oxfam
claims that its "inability to access information that would otherwise be
disclosed pursuant to Section 1504 is directly traceable to the SEC's un-
lawful failure to issue a final rule by the statutory deadline" and that
Oxfam's "injury can only be redressed by an order from this Court com-
pelling the SEC's prompt performance of its obligation to issue a final
rule pursuant to Section 1504."135 While this lawsuit has yet to be fully
adjudicated, it represents a growing number of challenges to the SEC's
failure to issue a revised final rule. And, as will be further discussed in
the next section, there are an increasing number of negative implications
resulting from the SEC's continued delay in issuing a final revised rule.
C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONTINUED DELAY
The SEC's continued delay in promulgating a revised final rule creates
negative consequences for both extraction industry issuers and propo-
nents of Section 1504 who are waiting for the beneficial effects of the
mandatory disclosures to be realized. Moreover, the continued delay also
increases the risk of creating an international patchwork of regulation,
with many additional disclosure and compliance issues, because multiple
countries are currently adopting rules that model the SEC original rule,
while the SEC is considering changes that could affect the original disclo-
sure requirements for companies in the United States. Furthermore,
larger companies whose subsidiaries and affiliates operate in multiple se-
130. Id. at 4.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 17.
135. Id. at 19-20.
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curities markets face the potential challenge of having to manage and
tailor disclosures to multiple different regions of operations, which will
create more compliance and legal related expenses.
Extraction industry issuers are also negatively affected because they
are currently stuck in limbo-not knowing what the final disclosure re-
quirements will be-and the SEC only continues to tell issuers to standby
and monitor the developments closely, without providing any clarity
about when a new rule will be implemented or what the final revised rule
will look like.136 Thus, issuers are unsure whether they should begin im-
plementing portions of the law to get a head start on compliance efforts,
or if they should stick their head in the sand and wait until a revised rule
is promulgated.
Similarly, proponents of Section 1504 are stuck waiting for the benefi-
cial effects of the mandatory disclosures to be realized and still do not
have any payment information to help investors and citizens almost five
years after Congress enacted Section 1504 in 2010. Meanwhile, the
United States is also falling behind as a world leader in transparency ini-
tiatives. In 2010, Congress created what is becoming the world standard
today. And while other countries have followed our perceived lead, the
current lengthy delays by the SEC in promulgating a final revised rule
negatively affects our early initiatives. Countries that drafted and
adopted laws based on the United States' Section 1504 standards are now
wondering how their laws will match up against the SEC's revised final
rule. The next section of this article will further discuss the multiple Sec-
tion 1504-type international rules that have been recently enacted.
V. SIMILAR INTERNATIONAL RULES
This portion of the article will examine similar international rules that
have been proposed or adopted since Section 1504 was signed into law.
"In enacting Section 1504, Congress sought to have the United States set
the "global standard" in the field of extractive industries payment disclo-
sure.137 Congress intended for the standard set by Section 1504 to be the
model for other jurisdictions' extractive payments disclosure regula-
tions.' 38 This intended objective can be inferred from the congressional
record discussing Section 1504 and the short statutory deadline for
promulgating a final rule provided for in Section 1504. To that end, the
SEC's 2012 final rule, even though it was later vacated and remanded, has
already made a substantial contribution to the development of a global
transparency standard. Many other countries and jurisdictions, for exam-
ple, have made significant progress in passing transparency laws modeled
after Section 1504 and the SEC's 2012 original final rule.
136. Letter from Royal Dutch Shell to S.E.C. (Oct. 25, 2010), https:f/www.sec.gov/com
ments/df-title-xv/specialized-disclosures/specializeddisclosures-33.pdf.
137. Oxfam America Complaint, supra note 129, at 11; see also 156 CONG. REC. S3316
(daily ed. May 6, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cardin).
138. Oxfam America Complaint, supra note 129, at 11.
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"On June 12, 2013, the European Union adopted new transparency re-
quirements for extractive companies that were expressly based on the
SEC's 2012 final rule."'1 39 The provision requires full disclosure of all
payments above $100,000 on a project-by-project basis.140 The Parlia-
ment was successful in removing "the 'tyrant's veto' from the draft legis-
lation-a clause exempting companies from the reporting requirements
where the host country's criminal law bans such disclosure.' 14 1 The Eu-
ropean Union's requirements also go beyond Section 1504 by expanding
the disclosure requirements to also cover large, privately owned firms and
companies operating in the logging sector. 142 The legislation instructs the
European Commission to consider extending the rules to more industries.
"The European Union's member-states are now obliged to transpose
these requirements into national law within 24 months."'1 43
In response to the new transparency requirements adopted by the Eu-
ropean Union, the United Kingdom, on December 1, 2014, passed an oil,
gas, and mining transparency law that made "the European Union's Ac-
counting Directives the law of the land in the United Kingdom with the
European Union's Transparency Directives to follow soon."'144 "The Ac-
counting Directives require large public companies incorporated in the
EU to report their payments-which includes Shell, BP, Total, Anglo
American, and others.' 45 Whereas, "the Transparency Directives re-
quire companies listed on EU-regulated stock exchanges to report their
payments, including Gazprom and Sinopec."' 14 6
Furthermore, Canada is making great strides in its transparency initia-
tives and disclosure requirements as well.147 On December 16, 2014, the
Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act became law after receiving
royal assent by Canada's governor general. 148 The Act requires all enti-
ties involved in the commercial development of oil, gas or minerals, in
Canada or elsewhere, to report payments greater than C$100,000 made to
domestic or foreign governments annually and to make the information
139. Id.
140. Oil, gas, mineral and logging firms obliged to disclose payments to governments,





143. Oxfam America Complaint, supra note 129, at 11.
144. Id.
145. UK Passes Historic Transparency Law For Oil, Gas And Mining Companies,
OXI AM AMERICA (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/uk-passes-
historic-transparency-law-for-oil-gas-and-mining-companies/; see also The Reports
on Payments to Governments Regulations 2014, 2014 No. 3209 (UK), http://www
.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/3209/contents/made.
146. OXFAm AMERICA, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Alan Ross et al., 2014 in Review: Top 10 legislative and regulatory changes for the
Canadian Oil and Gas Industry, BLG (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.blg.com/en/news
andpublications/publication_3971.
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contained in those reports public. 14 9 The new law applies to companies
listed on a Canadian stock exchange, as well as entities that have a place
of business in Canada, do business in Canada, or have assets in Canada, if
they meet two of the three thresholds for at least one of their two most
recent financial years: (i) at least C$20 million in assets, (ii) at least C$40
million in revenue, and (iii) an average of at least 250 employees. 150 Af-
ter deliberating whether exemptions from the reporting standards should
be allowed, "such as in circumstances where the standards conflict with
laws that prohibit disclosure of the required information or conflict with
contractual provisions regarding confidentiality, the Consultation Paper
proposed that no exemptions from the reporting standards be
granted."'1 51 Furthermore, failure to comply with the Extractive Sector
Transparency Measures Act can trigger substantial penalties-up to
C$250,000 per day. 152
Thus, while the United States, with the SEC's 2012 final rule, was suc-
cessful in spurring many other countries into action, many commenters
now believe that the United States risks falling behind and weakening the
extraction issuer transparency movement if the SEC continues to delay
issuing a revised final rule.153 As many other countries adopt their own
rules for resource extraction issuers, a revised final rule by the SEC that
is materially different than the 2012 rule presents a large risk of creating a
global patchwork of regulation-where rules and requirements differ
from country to country-which would require expensive micromanage-
ment compliance procedures. Additionally, if the SEC does not issue a
revised final rule within the next few months, many believe that Con-
gress' intent that the United States be one of the world-leaders in trans-
parency and disclosure initiatives will be frustrated. Next, in the final
section of this article, I will draw together my conclusions and make mod-
est recommendations.
VI. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS
This section will explore the SEC's proposed timeline for initiating Sec-
tion 1504 revised rulemaking, as well as discuss conclusions and modest
recommendations based on the original congressional intent outlined in
Section 1504. According to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, the SEC plans to initiate revised rulemaking for Section 1504-
the second attempt at writing new rules for oil, gas and mining companies
to disclose what they pay governments for their natural resources-by
149. Alan Ross, supra note 148; see also Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act,
S.C. 2014, c 39, s 376, s 1-30.
150. Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, supra note 149, at s 8.
151. Podowski & Poirier, Increasing Transparency in the Extractive Industry: The Cana-
dian Approach, Wi-o's WHo LEGAI (Jan. 2015), http://whoswholegal.com/news/
features/article/31977/increasing-transparency-extractive-industry-canadian-
approach.
152. Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, supra note 149, at s 24.
153. Oxfam America Complaint, supra note 129, at 10-11.
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October 2015.154 But this agenda is not binding and provides no guaran-
tee that final rules will be adopted in 2015. And given the substantial
delays to this point, it is possible that the non-binding deadline could be
further delayed. But depending on the outcome of Oxfam America's
2014 lawsuit, a revised rule is likely to be created within the next year.
The last section of this article will discuss modest recommendations and
the reasoning behind them.
Recommendations: In order to achieve the expressed Congressional ob-
jective of making payments by extractives companies to governments
more transparent, the SEC should produce a strong Section 1504 revised
final rule requiring public, project-level reporting by company, with no
categorical exemptions. This revised rule would include most of the same
requirements as the original rule, with an expressed public disclosure re-
quirement. But given the holding in American Petroleum Institute v.
SEC, the SEC may have to include justifications and fact-findings in its
revised rule to support its position and to show that the revised final rules
were based on the SEC's own judgment-instead of relying solely on
what the SEC thought the statute mandated. 155 Moreover, Congress
should amend Section 1504 to clearly define "to the extent practicable"
and address whether the resource extraction payment reports must be
made public and what exemptions, if any, should be given. These actions
will make the rules more clear and mitigate potential lawsuits that chal-
lenge the new rule and its effects.
In order to demonstrate the Congressional intent of Section 1504, a
group of "13 senior Senators, including the original co-sponsors of the
legislation and the Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, sent a letter
to the SEC on May 1, 2014, reminding the agency of the statutory dead-
line and calling for a release of strong final rules this year."'156 Within the
letter, the senators noted that "[p]rompt enactment of a robust rule will
help protect U.S. investors, promote U.S. national and energy security,
and create more stable operating environments for American busi-
nesses."'157 In fact, industry participants are beginning to request strong
mandatory disclosure requirements to benefit their business.1 58 "Large
public companies, such as Newmont Mining, Rio Tinto, Statoil, and Tul-
low Oil, have publicly emphasized the benefits their companies receive
from increased transparency.' '159
154. Oxfam America's Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Oxfam Am., Inc. v. SEC,
No. 1:14-CV-13648 at 6 (D. Mass. Sept. 2, 2015).
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ter from 13 Senators to the SEC (May 1, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-
title-xv/resource-extraction-issuers/resourceextractionissuers-41.pdf.
157. Letter from 13 Senators to the SEC, supra note 156.
158. Id.
159. Congress calls on SEC to release extractives transparency rule is year, OXFAM (June
12, 2014), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/congress-calls-on-sec-to-release-ex
tractives-transparency-rule-this-year/.
2015] EFFECTS OF SECTION 1504 DODD-FRANK ACT 393
To better assess and address the concerns of industry participants af-
fected by Section 1504, "Revenue Watch Institute and Columbia Law
School conducted a joint study of over 100 oil and mining contracts be-
tween local governments and extractive companies." "The study found
that 'many companies maintain confidentiality rules around contract
terms chiefly as a matter of habit' and 'most deals include few matters of
genuine commercial sensitivity.' '"160 The results of the study also con-
firmed that most "confidential" or "proprietary" information would
likely already be public information or "would be of such minimal com-
petitive value that, with the exception of references to future transactions
and trade secrets (for which Section 1504 does not require disclosure),
they would not cause substantial harm to an issuer's competitive posi-
tion.' 161 "This is likely because the most sensitive information for extrac-
tion issuers, specifically geological data, costs, and profits, is not covered
by Section 1504.'162
Furthermore, the threat of a competitive disadvantage is less significant
if the final disclosure rules are adopted with universal or near-universal
coverage of international oil companies and publically listed national oil
companies.' 63 "Under this scenario, national oil companies would be lim-
ited to a handful of partners if they wished to avoid public disclosure" of
Section 1504-type payment information.' 64 And, as discussed above,
many international countries have already adopted laws and initiatives
similar or more rigorous than Section 1504 and the SEC's original rule. [65
Therefore, it is likely that any potential advantage gained by non-Section
1504 companies will be mitigated by wide-scale adoption that naturally
eliminates most of the opportunities non-Section 1504 companies would
have had to gain a competitive advantage.' 66
In conclusion, while the costs should be considered carefully, a Section
1504-based revised final rule requiring public, project-level reporting by
each company, with no categorical exemptions, is likely the best way to
achieve the expressed Congressional objective of making payments by ex-
tractives companies to governments more transparent. Moreover, at this
point, the United States needs to maintain the universal standard that is
being adopted all over the world and avoid creating a global patchwork
regulatory environment. No market participants want the additional con-
fusion of being listed on two securities exchanges and having to keep
track of two different reporting requirements. Furthermore, a relatively
weak revised final SEC rule, which included categorical exemptions and
160. Branden Carl Berns, Will Oil and Gas Issuers Leave U.S. Equity Markets in Re-
sponse to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act? Can They Afford Not to?, 2011
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did not require public disclosures, would result in much of the same com-
pliance costs and would significantly reduce the positive impacts of the
rule that Congress intended for investors and impoverished citizens in
resource-rich countries.
